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The main problem with our society, are these broken links.
Everything that ties us together between regions, generations, past
and present, has been shattered by the Soviet Union, the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the successor regime to the Soviet Union. We
will only become a healthy society once we have rebuilt those
connections, somehow.1

INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE
Since the mid-1990s, the Russian Federation (Russia) has been
engaged in a series of violent struggles within its North Caucasus
territory.2 While much attention has rightly focused on the Republic
of Chechnya, the locus of two wars and a protracted counterterrorist
operation, the nature of the violence has varied across the region in
the interceding years.3 In the neighboring Republic of Dagestan,
violence increased after Russia declared an end to the second
Chechen war.4 Efforts to sustainably stem violence in this restive
republic have been stymied because Russia has failed to meaningfully
address a series of critically important contextual factors: Dagestani
governance, the backdrop of regional violence, and human rights
violations against the local population. In short, conflict occurs in
context, and by failing to connect the dots, Moscow’s policies have
undermined security in its periphery–Dagestan’s capital,
Makhachkala, and the hinterlands it governs.
Charles King notes, “Awe and terror have often been intertwined
in outsiders’ conceptions of the Caucasus.”5 Indeed, it is terror that
focused U.S. attention on this oft-overlooked corner of Russia in the

1. BEN JUDAH, FRAGILE EMPIRE: HOW RUSSIA FELL IN AND OUT OF LOVE WITH
VLADIMIR PUTIN 253 (2013) (quoting Filip Dzyadko, characterized as a journalist and
activist).
2. Note that there is also a series of historical conflicts, discussed briefly infra,
that provide the backdrop for the current situation, including Russia’s Caucasus Wars
of the seventeenth century and Stalin’s population purges of the 1940s. For analysis
of contemporary and historic conflicts, see CHARLES KING, THE GHOST OF FREEDOM
5 (2008); ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA—TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER (1998);
ROBERT SCHAEFER, THE INSURGENCY IN CHECHNYA AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS
(2011); Svante E. Cornell, The War against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya:
A Case for Distinction, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 167, 169–70 (2003).
3. For information on violence levels, see Statistics of Victims, CAUCASIAN
KNOT (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/search?rubric_id=601
(noting, for example, that seventy-six persons fell to armed conflicts in Northern
Caucasus in August 2013).
4. Id.
5. KING, supra note 2, at 5.
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spring of 2013.6 Anzor and Zubeidat Tsarnaev, the parents of
Dzhokar and Tamarlan, the two young men accused of carrying out
the Boston Marathon bombing in April of 2013, live in Makhachkala.7
News articles after the attack were peppered with questions about
whether the brothers Tsarnaev were radicalized in Dagestan.8 A
report scheduled for release in the summer of 2013 asks whether the
violence of the region has come to the United States, in essence from
the Caucasus to Copley.9 Additionally, the 2014 Winter Olympics are
in nearby Sochi, Russia. The state has invested heavily in security for
the Olympics, and militants have threatened the international event.10
“Awe and terror” are also reflected in considering the basic human
dignity of the ten million people who live in that region.11 Since the
beginning of the first Chechen war in 1994, tens of thousands have
been killed, hundreds of thousands have been wounded and even
more have had their lives disrupted by violence.12 Nearly a year prior
to his death, murdered Dagestani journalist Akhmednabi
Akhmednabiyev reflected on human rights concerns in the Republic
and stated, “Such a feeling that time in Russia and Dagestan flows in
the opposite direction, the authorities want to return society to the
Stalinist-Soviet era, where the right to absolute truth belonged only to

6. See Scott Shane & David M. Herszenhorn, Agents Pore Over Suspect’s Trip
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
29,
2013,
Russia,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/us/tamerlan-tsarnaevs-contacts-on-russian-tripdraw-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all.
7. See Josh Levs & Ben Brumfield, Boston Probe Eyes Slain Canadian Jihadist,
Source Says, CNN (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/29/us/boston-attack;
see also Indictment, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-2106-MBB (D. Mass. June 27, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/632013627162038513370.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Steven Rosenberg, Boston Bombings: Was Dagestan the Starting
Point?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22315870.
9. See Gordon Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Comes to America: The Boston
Marathon Attack, U.S.-RUSSIA.ORG (June 20, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://usrussia.org/1348-the-caucasus-emirate-comes-to-america-the-boston-marathonattack.html (providing an executive summary of the forthcoming report’s content).
10. See Thomas Grove, Islamist Rebel Vows ‘Maximum Force’ to Stop Sochi
Olympics, REUTERS, July 2, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-russiaolympics-militants-idUSBRE96207T20130703.
11. INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE NORTH CAUCASUS: THE CHALLENGES OF
INTEGRATION (I), ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT 3 (2012), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/220-the-north-caucasusthe-challenges-of-integration-i-ethnicity-and-conflict.pdf (rounding up from a
population estimate of 9.86 million).
12. EMMA GILLIGAN, TERROR IN CHECHNYA: RUSSIA AND THE TRAGEDY OF
CIVILIANS IN WAR 1–14 (2010).

to
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the state and its opponents were [a]waiting either endless prosecution
or imprisonment and extrajudicial execution.”13
This Article begins with the first contextual factor of governance.
It sets the geopolitical stage, situating Dagestan within the Russian
Federation and highlighting Moscow’s bungled approach to ruling
Makhachkala. Part II places militant violence in contemporary
context, examining Chechnya and Dagestan. Part III examines
human rights issues connected to efforts to stem the violence in
Dagestan. While a host of human rights violations could be
examined, the focus herein is on journalists and human rights
defenders. The conclusion completes the journey and reviews the
consequences.
The consequences addressed in that final Part are important for
policymakers focused on the region and have comparative value as
well. Successful and sustainable efforts to stem political violence,
including terrorism, must be undertaken with due consideration for
the broader conflict context. Such efforts, whether undertaken by
Russia, or other countries such as the United States, the United
Kingdom or Israel, must also be cognizant of the expansive backdrop
constructed where state and society meet and diverge over space and
time. Domestic and international counterterrorism measures must be
part and parcel of larger, more comprehensive strategies that are
willing to embrace the complexities and intersections of geography,
culture, politics, and history. Through embracing these complexities,
policymakers may find windows of opportunity to transform
situations away from violence and toward sustainable peace, thus
reducing the risk of terrorism, from Moscow to Makhachkala.
I. THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN CONTEXT
Governance can be defined “as the traditions and institutions that
determine how authority is exercised in a particular country.”14 This
section examines Moscow’s missteps regarding two key governance
challenges in Dagestan: the construction and management of the
North Caucasus Federal District, and the state’s management of
republic-level politics. This analysis demonstrates the disconnect that
exists between Moscow and Makhachkala and the people in between,

13. Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, Weekly Lashes out at Abductions, Executions
of Dagestanis by Russian Troops, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 5, 2012,
available at LexisNexis.
14. Daniel Kaufman et al., Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action,
&
DEV.,
June
2000,
available
at
FIN.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/kauf.htm.
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the citizens of the Republic.
To provide a backdrop for
understanding these two contextual issues, this Part begins with an
introduction to Dagestan: the land and people of the mountains.
A. Setting the Stage: Land and People of the Mountains
The Republic of Dagestan is situated in the southwestern corner of
Russia, nestled in the Caucasus Mountains, a chain that runs east to
west across southern Russia.15 The Caucasus Mountains form a real,
physical boundary that separates the region from the rest of Russia,
especially Moscow, the federal capital situated more than 1000 miles
to the north of Makhachkala, the republic’s capital city.16 Within
Russia, Dagestan’s territorial neighbors include the Republic of
Chechnya, Stavrapol Krai, and the Republic of Kalmykiya.17
Externally, it borders the Caspian Sea as well as the states of Georgia
and Azerbaijan.18
The North Caucasus, depending on perspective, could be termed a
magnificent melding or malevolent maelstrom of topography,
ethnicities, languages, religion, and political ambitions, including
territorial nationalism. Dagestan in particular embodies these
characterizations as the most heterogeneous of its regional
neighbors.19 The former president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam
Magomedov, acknowledged, “Dagestan is a multiethnic republic. We
have more than 120 ethnic groups and 33 peoples and nationalities.”20
Many scholars, analysts and journalists concur as it is described as
“the most diverse republic in the Russian territories.”21 Dominant
ethnic groups include the Avar (29.4%); Dargin (17%); Kumyk

15. KING, supra note 2, at 7–10.
16. See THOMAS DEWAAL, THE CAUCASUS: AN INTRODUCTION 6 (2010);
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then
search “A” for “Moscow, Russia” and search “B” for “Makhachkala, Dagestan;”
then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (giving driving
directions from Moscow, Russia to Makhachkala, Dagestan).
17. KING, supra note 2, at 2. For constitutional distinctions between the types of
administrative units, see infra notes 32–33.
18. KING, supra note 2, at 2.
19. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 11, at 3.
20. Russia Dagestan Head Discusses Work to Prevent Ethnic, Religious Tensions,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 8, 2012, available at LexisNexis.
21. See, e.g., Chechnya and Dagestan Are Not the Same Thing: A Brief Look at
Conflict in the Caucasus, CENT. EURASIA STANDARD (Apr. 19, 2013),
https://cestandard.wordpress.com/2013/04/19/chechnya-and-dagestan-are-not-thesame-thing-a-brief-look-at-conflict-in-the-caucasus.
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(14.9%); and the Lezgin (13.3).22 Less concurrence is found regarding
the total population numbers: an increase of nearly half a million
persons between the 2002 and 2010 census has been called “an
astonishing and suspiciously high spike of population.”23 Russian
census numbers put the population at 2.9 million, with approximately
700,000 residing in Makhachkala.24
Within the population, the rise, fall, and entrenchment of various
faiths and sects have been interwoven with the historical ambitions of
empires, including Persia, the Ottomans, and Russia, as well as local
geography of mountains and valleys.25 Islam first arrived in Dagestan
in the seventh century; since then, various schools and sects thereof
have held sway with the population.26 Sunni and Sufi Islam have
emerged as the dominant forms, and both have helped shape
repeated resistance to Russia’s hegemonic efforts in the North
Caucasus.27 On this point, however, intellectual caution urges against
essentializing:
Historians and more contemporary analysts both sympathetic and
antagonistic to the mountaineers’ resistance routinely emphasize the
fundamental importance of Islam in the Caucasian Wars [of
centuries past], arguing (or assuming) that religion served as the
prime motivation in the mountaineers’ resistance against the
Russian infidel . . . . [However, Islam’s] significance lies less in its
ability to motivate resistance than as a guide for how the resisters
should organize their communal lives.28

22. Anna Mateeva, The North Caucasus and the Challenges of Minority
Governance, in MANAGING ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN RUSSIA 134 (Oleh Protsyk &
Benedikt Harzl eds., 2013).
23. Valery Dzutsev, North Caucasus Demographics Show the Regional
Administrations’ Power to Skew Figures, JAMESTOWN FOUND., Apr. 6, 2011,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37756.
24. After the Previous Census Population of Dagestan Went up by Almost
400,000, CAUCASIAN KNOT, Nov. 17, 2010, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/15225.
25. See generally GREGORY HOSKING, RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS (2011)
(providing an overarching history); ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV,
DAGESTAN: RUSSIAN HEGEMONY AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE IN THE NORTH
CAUCASUS (2010).
26. See generally WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, particularly chapters 2 and 5.
27. See id.; see also HOSKING, supra note 25; SCHAEFER, supra note 2.
28. Michael Reynolds, Myths and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspective on
Islam and Conflict in the North Caucasus, 41 MIDDLE E. STUDIES 31, 39 (2005).
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The North Caucasus Federal District: Adding Fuel to a
Governance Fire

Within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or the
Soviet Union), organizing the public lives of the citizenry was the
state’s job.29 When the USSR collapsed in December 1991, one state
vanished from the map and fifteen new ones emerged in its stead,
including the Russian Federation.30 According to its constitution,
Russia is a democratic state with “a republican form of
government.”31 The Republic of Dagestan is one of eighty-three
administrative divisions that comprise the federation.32 It is part of
the North Caucasus Federal District, one of eight meta-governance
constructions within Russia, which bridges the political gap between
the multitude of smaller entities and the federal state.33 Originally,
seven districts were created by presidential decree in May of 2000, by
the then newly-elected President Vladimir Putin, and from 2000 until
2010, Dagestan was part of the Southern Federal District.34 Putin
viewed the North Caucasus from the perspective that “the problems
of this region required political transformation.”35 Some observers
have characterized his organization of the districts as part of his
power vertical approach to governing Russia.36 Yet, the power
vertical, understood as an “effort to establish a vertical chain of

29. See MARK R. BESSINGER, NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLAPSE
SOVIET STATE 50 (2002) (“Throughout its 74-year history the Soviet regime
engaged in a massive and frequently forceful effort to impose a particular vision on a
multicultural population . . . . Soviet rulers consistently attempted to create a civic
form of political and cultural allegiance, a sense of patriotism and shared political
identity.”).
30. RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 420 (2008).
31. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 1
(RUSS.), available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml (last
visited July 15, 2013).
32. See Russian Federation—About the Country, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAM, http://www.undp.ru/index.php?iso=RU&lid=1&pid=38 (last visited July
15, 2013); see also KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (RUSS.) (“A republic (state) shall have its own constitution and
legislation. A kray (or krai), oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast
and autonomous okrug shall have its own charter and legislation.”). For the full text
of the constitution, see supra note 31.
33. Liz Fuller, Medvedev Creates New North Caucasus Federal District, RADIO
FREE
EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY
(Jan.
20,
2010),
http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Creates_New_North_Caucasus_Federal_Dis
trict/1934705.html.
34. Id. Putin had served as acting prime minister to President Boris Yeltsin, then
replaced him as acting president before he was elected in March 2000.
35. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 3.
36. RICHARD SAWKA, PUTIN – RUSSIA’S CHOICE 130 (2010).
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hierarchical authority, with strong, uncompromising government from
the top,”37 is inconsistent with Dagestan’s political norms, which have
historically valued collegiality and “pluralistic representation.”38
President Dmitri Medvedev, who succeeded Putin after the latter
had served two terms, undertook a reorganization of the Southern
Federal District, purportedly because he observed ongoing obstacles
to this transformation.39 For example, in 2009, he acknowledged the
continuing problem of regional corruption and stated that although a
lot of money is earmarked for the North Caucasus, “the efficiency of
its spending leaves much to be desired. Moreover, part of the money
is almost openly embezzled by officials. This happens as the
unemployment and poverty in the Caucasus reaches extreme
heights.”40 The costs of corruption were known: in 2008, joining the
police could set you back $3000, medical school, $10,000 and some
government positions went for $300,000.41 Human Rights Watch
averred, “Corruption in Dagestan long ago reached astounding
proportions. The power structures seem to have merged fully with the
criminal world.”42 Meanwhile, significant portions of the population
were economically marginalized (up to eighty percent
unemployment), rendered vulnerable and unable to access the
mechanisms of power through which they might change their
circumstance.43 In the long term, this has all told to mean that Russia
has compromised the development of ethical government,
accountable public safety personnel and accessible health care,
undermining the physical security and well-being of the population.

37. Andrew Monaghan, The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia, 88 INT’L
AFF. 1, 8 (2012).
38. Stephen Blank, Russia’s Caucasus Wars: The Wrecks of Empire and the Wars
of Decolonization, 34 AM. FOREIGN POL’Y INTERESTS 182, 184 (2012).
39. For more on the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” of governance, see generally
MARIE MENDRAS, RUSSIAN POLITICS: THE PARADOX OF A WEAK STATE (2012).
40. Down-to-Earth Problems at the Core of Medvedev’s Second Address, RT
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://rt.com/news/medvedev-annual-address-modernization.
41. INT’L CRISIS GRP., RUSSIA’S DAGESTAN: CONFLICT CAUSES 13 (2008),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/192_russia_s_dagestan_conflict_caus
es.
42. Tanya Lokshina, Dagestan: Curse of the Sixth Department, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (May 18, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/18/dagestan-curse-sixthdepartment.
43. Briefing: Dagestan: A New Flashpoint in Russia’s North Caucasus, COMM’N
ON
SECURITY
AND
COOPERATION
EUR.
(June
16,
2009),
http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRe
cord_id=453.
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Problems notwithstanding, for Medvedev, the challenges of the
North Caucasus had identifiable solutions, at least in theory. He
stated:
We will do everything possible to allow the people in Russia’s
Caucasus to lead normal lives. Economic and humanitarian
programmes [sic] for the south of the country will soon be reviewed
and fleshed out . . . . At the same time, law enforcement authorities
will continue to stamp out the bandits who seek to intimidate and
terrorise [sic] the population of some Caucasian republics with their
crazy ideas and barbaric customs.44

Later that month, he again justified the state’s use of force in the
region and added “it would be better if there were none of it. But we
have completely failed to use economic tools.”45 To address the
former and remedy the latter, Medvedev appointed Alexsander
Khloponin as Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North
Caucasus and Deputy Prime Minister for the Russian Federation.46
The envoy was granted
powers of economic nature, powers connected with the performance
of duties as government deputy chairman and, on the other hand,
powers connected with the performance of duties in the presidential
vertical channel of command, or all the powers traditionally wielded
by the presidential representative in a federal district pertaining to
personnel, work with power and law-enforcement structures, and all
other issues within the official authority of plenipotentiary
representative.47

In short, he was granted a lot of theoretical power. Nearly two
years into his term, the presidential plenipotentiary had a cautiously
optimistic assessment of the work his administration had undertaken:
“The attitude and mindset of the people who reside and work in the
North Caucasus is changing in many respects, as is their attitude to
the federal centre and the federal centre’s attitude to the events
unfolding here, including political developments.”48

44. Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (Sept. 10,
2009), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298.
45. Medvedev Says Russia Must “Learn to Use Economic Tools” In North
Caucasus, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 15, 2009, available at LexisNexis.
46. See Medvedev Names Ex-Top Manager as Envoy to Volatile Caucasus,
RIANOVOSTI (Jan. 19, 2010), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100119/157615846.html.
47. Russian Pundits “Surprised” by Tandem’s Choice for Envoy to Caucasus,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 22, 2010, available at LexisNexis.
48. Russian President’s Envoy Discusses North Caucasus, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Dec. 19, 2012, available at LexisNexis.
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Others have had less favorable assessments of Khloponin, as well
as the post he occupies, and he has been criticized as being politically
impotent. An editorial in Gazeta.ru lamented Russia’s lack of a
coherent policy and unrealistic development expectations for the
region as well as the limited political stature of the envoy.49 The
Jamestown Foundation added that Moscow’s “top-down approach . . .
to the economic development of the North Caucasus has produced
little progress so far.”50 Overall, “diminished political access and local
accountability that resulted from renewed centralization led to
increased levels of corruption, alienation, radicalism and terrorism in
this volatile region.”51 Baev further observed (although some may
disagree) that the identification of the problem, in part, had missed its
mark.52 Rather than having economic or developmental roots, “[i]t is
the paternalistic political system based on administrative corruption
that generates social discontent and fosters extremism. However,
neither Khloponin nor Medvedev have any idea how to transform
it.”53 Thus, neither the South nor the North Caucasus Federal
Districts have fixed what politically ails Dagestan, and they likely
created a context that worsened the situation. Notably, Moscow has
not fared much better with their approach to local governance at the
republic level.

1.

Dagestan: All Politics Is Local?54

As a republic within Russia’s federal system, Dagestan has a local
government: an executive, a parliament, and a judiciary.55 It also has
its own constitution, promulgated in July 1994 and subsequently
amended.56 Dagestan’s internal governance structures, due in part to

49. See Russian Editorial Says Putin Shows Little Interest in North Caucasus,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 15, 2012, available at LexisNexis.
50. Jamestown Foundation, Moscow’s Envoy to the North Caucasus Expected to
Assume Greater Powers, REFWORLD (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=514079d12.
51. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 3.
52. See Pavel Baev, The Terrorism-Corruption Nexus in the North Caucasus, 114
PONARS
EURASIA
POLICY
MEMO
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_114.pdf.
53. Id.
54. This is a creative application of Tip O’Neil’s famous phrase. See TIP O’NEIL,
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL (1994).
55. See THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN, http://eng.nsrd.ru (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013); REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN, http://www.government-rd.ru (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013).
56. See Nabi Abdullaev, Constitutional Amendments Threaten to Destabilize
Situation
in
Dagestan,
JAMESTOWN
FOUND.
(Apr.
17,
1998),
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ethnic heterogeneity and developing competition for power amongst
ascendant groups and clans, had depended on local, internal
bargaining between various elites and factions.57 Since Putin’s ascent
to power, however, the federal government has been playing a game
of political paddleball with Dagestan’s government, and Dagestan is
losing.
To diffuse potential ethnic tensions over leadership, the
constitution originally called for an executive centered on a state
council whose head would ostensibly rotate amongst Dagestan’s key
ethnic groups.58 Building on that centralization theme, in 2000,
Moscow asked Dagestani officials to proffer a list of constitutional
discrepancies between the republic and federal levels, which were
then addressed.59
Many of the changes made subordinated
Dagestan’s internal independence within the federation, while at the
same time elevating federal power within the republic’s constitution.60
In 2003, subsequent amendments, instigated by Moscow, reoriented
more power away from the republic and towards the center, including
the elimination of the State Council and the creation of a presidential
executive.61 Pointedly, the State Council had been described as a
“collegial executive body,” comprised of Dagestan’s key ethnic
groups.62 In 2005, prior to its dismantlement, one observer sagely
noted,
[T]he republic’s people firmly believe that the collegiate form of
government (even a curtailed one) prevents the monopolization of
power and property by an ethnic community. The ethnic elite and
the people of Dagestan think that a rejection of ethnic collegiality
would lead to a redivision of property, power and administrative

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=7480&t
x_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=220#.Ud694D7FQgU. For the text of the constitution
(in Russian), see supra note 31.
57. See WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25.
58. See C.W. BLANDY, CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTRE, DAGESTAN:
BIRTH
OF
A
PRESIDENTIAL
REPUBLIC
3
(2006),
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/87422/ipublicationdocument_singledo
cument/761c5a49-17f5-470e-b952-f14ad9b702bf/en/06_jun.pdf.
59. See Robert Bruce Ware et al., Stability in the Caucasus: The Perspective from
Dagestan, PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM, Mar./Apr. 2003, available at
http://www.siue.edu/~rware/Stability_in_the_Caucasus.pdf.
60. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 162–64, tbl.7.1
61. Id. at 156-202.
62. Robert Bruce Ware, Recent Russian Federal Elections in Dagestan:
Implications for Proposed Electoral Reform, 57 EUR.-ASIA STUD., 583, 600 n.25
(June 2005).
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benefits and hence
arbitrariness.63

plunge

the

republic

[Vol. XLI
into

chaos

and

This is not to suggest that the State Council was perfect in
construction or practice.64
Rather, Moscow was removing
mechanisms through which Dagestanis had managed ethnic affairs
and the republic.65 Moreover, these constitutional changes were put
in place without most Dagestanis’ support.66 Consequently, “those
who were aggrieved would likely grow in number and could only seek
supporters and allies who cast themselves in opposition to Moscow.”67
Moscow, however, did not seem to be paying attention to a plurality
of local concerns.
A major, federal political change in 2004 was channeled through
the lens of the tragic events at Beslan, in North Ossetia, in early
September of that year.68 At Beslan’s School Number One, militants
opposed to Russia’s Chechnya policy stormed a local school and held
more than a thousand people hostage, including several hundred
children.69 When the siege was over more than three hundred were
dead, including more than 150 children, and hundreds were
wounded.70 In remarks responding to the tragedy, President Putin
stated, “In general, we need to admit that we did not show an
understanding of the complexities and dangers of the processes
occurring in our own country and in the world.”71 On one level, he
was correct—there had been a profound failure to understand the
roots of the conflict and effectively mitigate grievances, let alone
appreciate the dynamic nature of the threat or the state’s
vulnerabilities. However, rather than respond in a contextually

63. Sergei Markedonov, Dagestan: A Sleeping Volcano in a Land of Ethnic
RIA
NOVOSTI
(Oct.
6,
2005),
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050610/40504629.html.
64. For example, the International Crisis Group noted that “the ruling elite was
criticised [sic] for ‘Darginising’ the republic, as Magomedov severely diminished the
Gossovet’s [State Council’s] role.” See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 3.
65. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 184
66. See BLANDY, supra note 58, at 3.
67. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25 at 185.
68. See Russia’s Putin Gains Power to Appoint Regional Governors; Unity
Against Terrorism Cited as Goal, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 16, 2004, available at
LexisNexis.
69. SCHAEFER, supra note 2, at 226–27.
70. Nick Patton Walsh et al., Putin’s Warning as Terror Deaths Top 360,
(London),
Sept.
4,
2004,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/05/russia.chechnya5.
71. Sheila Pulham et al., Death Toll Rises to 323 at Beslan, GUARDIAN (London),
Sept. 4, 2004, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/04/russia.chechnya.
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appropriate way, the Russian president consolidated the Kremlin’s
power and signed new legislation stipulating the presidential
appointment of local leaders.72
Putin’s effective removal of the republics’ authority to directly elect
their own leaders was part of “a series of counter-reforms aimed at
tightening the political regime . . . . [W]ith some elements of
decorative (mock) democracy.”73 This change was likely acutely felt
in Makhachkala in 2006 when Magomedali Magomedov, who had
ruled Dagestan since Soviet times, left office.74 While some have
expressed surprise at his departure, others have characterized it as an
orchestrated or forced retirement, with Putin clearly calling the
shots.75 Magomedov, an ethnic Dargin, was replaced by Mukhu
Aliyev, an ethnic Avar.76
Recall that Dagestan’s constitution
originally envisioned a shifting of power within the ethnic leadership
of the State Council. Nevertheless, through a range of machinations,
Magomedov had maintained power.77 Thus, the swing in control from
a powerful, but smaller ethnic group, the Dargins, to the Avars, the
largest, was a significant shift at the Republic level.78 While on the
one hand, the ascent of an Avar leader assuaged some of their
concerns, it also “alienated the Dargin economic elite and created
grievances.”79 Moscow was meddling again, without an apparent
appreciation of the context or consequences.
Aliyev remained in power until early 2010, when the Kremlin
appointed Magomedsalam Magomedov (son of the former leader

72. See Russia’s Putin Gains Power to Appoint Regional Governors; Unity
Against Terrorism Cited as Goal, supra note 68.
73. Putin’s Tricks, or Where Do Elections Go? INST. MODERN RUSSIA (Feb. 1,
2013),
http://imrussia.org/en/politics/380-putins-tricks-or-where-do-elections-go.
Note that the Institute of Modern Russia is run by Pavel Khodorkovsky, the son of
imprisoned Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
74. See generally Head of Russia’s Dagestan Steps Down, BBC MONITORING
SERV., Feb. 16, 2006, available at Westlaw.
75. See e.g. Sergey Markedonov, The New Face of Dagestan,
RUSSIAPROFILE.ORG (Feb. 21, 2006), http://russiaprofile.org/politics/a4139.html
(commenting on the “sudden resignation” of Magomedali Magomedov). But see
Magomed Isayev, Dagestan: Magomedov’s Days Numbered?, INST. FOR WAR &
PEACE REPORTING (June 16, 2005), http://iwpr.net/report-news/dagestanmagomedovs-days-numbered (quoting a Dagestani government official on the
planned decision to “end Mr. Magomedov’s term and appoint another leader”).
76. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 2.
77. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 76–77.
78. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
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Magomedali) to lead Dagestan.80 His ascent to power coincided with
that of the new and aforementioned Presidential Plenipotentiary
Khlopinin, to change tacks in dealing with the North Caucasus.81 Part
of the purported rationale for appointing Aliyev was centered on the
belief that he would tackle corruption in the republic, which was seen
as a root of a range of problems, including militancy and criminality.82
Yet, when the younger Magomedov came to power, it was said that
“corruption, economic stagnation and massive unemployment are
part
of
the
legacy
Magomedov
inherited
from
his
predecessor . . . [yet] all those phenomena took root during the 14
years that Magomedov’s father, Magomedali, was republic head.”83
Aliyev’s detractors said he lacked the political power or cache to
“control the factions beneath him.”84 Consequently, rather than
mitigating the problems posed by corruption, they apparently became
more entrenched on his watch.
In 2012, then-President Medvedev moved to devolve authority
back to the republics, again allowing for direct elections.85
Contrastingly, less than year later, after Putin retook the presidency,
he moved to again recentralize authority over the region’s
executives.86 Noting the impending Olympics in nearby Sochi and the
ongoing unrest in the North Caucasus, a reporter observed, “The
Kremlin is concerned that direct elections in the volatile regions could
spark unrest or involve candidates whose loyalty is in question.”87
Within the month, Dagestan had scrapped its local election law, the
first of the republics to do so.88

80. See Russia’s Dagestan Head to Pardon Repentant Rebels, RELIEFWEB (Feb.
20,
2010),
http://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/russias-dagestan-headpardon-repentant-rebels
81. See Ellen Barry, Russia Names New Leader for Republic of Dagestan, N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
8,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/europe/09dagestan.html?_r=0.
82. See, e.g., BLANDY, supra note 58, at 14.
83. Daghestan’s President Suffers Further Rebuff, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY
(Jan.
6,
2011),
http://www.rferl.org/content/daghestan_president_further_rebuff/2268673.html.
84. Ellen Barry, Kremlin Faces Rising Turbulence in Another Unruly Republic,
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 2010, available at LexisNexis.
85. See Medvedev Endorses Law on Direct Governor Elections, RT (May 2,
2012), http://rt.com/politics/endorses-law-direct-elections-405.
86. See Alissa de Carbonnel, Putin Signs Law to Allow Him to Pick Russian
Governors, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/usrussia-elections-idUSBRE9310GR20130402.
87. Id.
88. See Russian Province in Caucasus to Let Putin Pick Governor, REUTERS, Apr.
18, 2013, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE93H0J520130418?irpc=932.

FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA

2013]

49

It is unclear whether this political mismanagement is a result of
ignorance, disdain, or intermittent disregard for Dagestan.
Contrastingly, the consequences are more visible: a population
lacking faith in its government, set against a backdrop of violent
instability. As the year 2013 dawned, Magomedov resigned (likely
with a push from Putin) and Moscow appointed another new leader
for Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, an ethnic Avar.89 Abdulatipov
acknowledged as much when he said, “The main question today is
how to restore the people’s confidence in the government? How to
overcome apathy and even rejection that actions of some of [the] big
guns in Dagestan caused?”90

2.

Moscow’s Meddling while Makhachkala’s Burning

The constitutional amendments, tinkering with the appointment,
and actual selection of regional leaders evince Moscow’s
misunderstanding of the Makhachkala and broader Dagestani
political context.
Alternatively, they spotlight the center’s
indifference or contempt for the local governance environment.
According to a regional expert:
There is a big disconnect between the political cultures of Moscow
and Dagestan. This is the [sic] partly the cause of misunderstandings
and conflict between the two. Moscow is trying to impose a
downsized model of Russian governance on Dagestan, but that does
not work, because Dagestan is so ethnically diverse. Dagestan is
naturally immune to being ruled by a strong hand, whereas for
Russia, a highly-centralised [sic] state is a very traditional form of
governance.91

Overall, this game of political paddleball or push-pull of federallocal control, without due regard for the local, political environment,
has undermined the development of an indigenous democracy in
Dagestan. Additionally, the tenacity of corruption and ineffective
state response, “has given rise to a huge gulf between the authorities
and the population at large.”92 Accordingly, rather than bringing
those within the Republic closer to the center, Moscow’s rule of

89. See Alexander Winning & Ivan Nechepurenko, Putin Ousts Dagestan Head
Magomedov, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, http://sptimes.ru/story/36885.
90. Russian President Wants Stability Restored in Dagestan—New Leader, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 28, 2013, available at LexisNexis.
91. Governing the North Caucasus, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Apr.
13, 2013), http://iwpr.net/report-news/governing-north-caucasus.
92. Daghestan’s President Suffers Further Rebuff, supra note 83.
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Makhachkala has only served to exacerbate the space between the
two.
II. FROM GROZNY TO MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA: MILITANT
VIOLENCE IN CONTEXT
Governance issues between Moscow and Makhachkala are only
one of the problems that plague Dagestan; militant violence is
another, and it is the focus of this Part. The casual observer of the
region is likely to associate violence and terrorism in the region with
the neighboring republic of Chechnya, which is where this section
begins. Notably, Chechnya is not Dagestan, and the two republics
have travelled different historio-political paths. The International
Crisis Group rightly reminds us that “[t]here is a common yet
erroneous tendency to analyse [sic] Dagestan in reference to
Chechnya.”93 While accurate, it is important to understand the role
the Chechen wars have played in the destabilization of the region and
thus Dagestan. This step back in time creates context and provides a
glimpse into Moscow’s other North Caucasian miscalculations.
Chechnya, after all, has been the locus of two pitched battles with the
federal state, its citizens, as well as Russian soldiers, all of whom have
been used as fodder in a battle for control in the region.94 While
Russia retreated in defeat from the first Chechen war, in the wake of
the second it has largely regained control of the territory through
brute force and the installation of local officials. Markedly, overt,
large-scale conflict in Chechnya has declined in recent years, relative
to the intense devastation of the two wars. However, areas of the
larger North Caucasus remain restive, and Dagestan is a focal point
for ongoing violence and the second half of this section. 95
A. The Chechen Context: “We Shall Respond to Every Chechen
Shot with Thousands of Our Own”96
The first Chechen War did not happen out of the blue. The seeds
were sown as the 1980s drew to a close and the Soviet Union emitted
its last gasps, when a local, national, Chechen campaign for self-

93. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 1.
94. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 12.
95. Valery Dzutsev, Political Reforms Still Possible in the North Caucasus, EUR.
COUNTRY
ORIGIN
INFO.
NETWORK
(Oct.
31,
2012),
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/230491/338886_en.html (last visited July 16, 2013).
96. MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, THE CHECHEN WARS : WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY
OF THE SOVIET UNION? 146 (2002) (quoting Russian Minister of Defense Pavel
Grachev).
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determination began to emerge.97 At the same time, the economic
situation in the region declined, in part due a reduction in budgetary
subsidies.98 The conditions in Chechnya were already dire with poor
health services, low wages, and inadequate educational
opportunities.99 A potent combination resulted, and some Chechens
advocated for self-rule while marginalized groups also advocated for
economic and “social justice.”100 Gall and de Waal echo this
dichotomy contrasting an uprising against historic wrongs, and the
underprivileged rebelling against “appalling” poverty.101
The Chechen uprising also unfolded amidst a complicated web of
Soviet and post-Soviet politics with competing centers of power, and
the North Caucasian Republic became ensnared.102 During the
Russian withdrawals of the early 1990s, the military left behind an
unfathomable amount of weapons—ranging from tanks to rocket
launchers to guns.103 This situation was compounded by Moscow’s lag
time in responding to Chechen aspirations and an underestimation of
the threat.104 Chechen leader Dhjokar Dudaev tried to capitalize on
the apparent disorganization of Russian troops who “were effectively
leaderless and in a state of complete confusion” with various national
and regional leaders also “vying for their support.”105 At the same
time, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Under Dudaev’s
leadership, the Chechen nationalist movement . . . [became]
increasingly radical in its demands, ultimately pressing for

97. RICHARD SEELY, THE RUSSO-CHECHEN CONFLICT, 1800–2000: A DEADLY
EMBRACE 90 (2004). At the time of the USSR’s collapse, Chechnya was part of a
Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic within Russia. For more on this, see, for
example, John Dunlop, How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died During the RussoChechen War of 1994–1996?, 19 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 329 (2000).
98. Svante E. Cornell, The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: From
Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration, 4 CHINA & EURASIA F. Q. 37, 56–57 (2006).
For example, Dagestan had garnered the vast majority of its budget from the USSR,
which changed as the regime collapsed resulting in economic decline.
99. JOHN B. DUNLOP, RUSSIA CONFRONTS CHECHNYA, 85–88 (1998).
100. Dzhabrail Gakaev, Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya, in
CHECHNYA FROM PAST TO FUTURE 21, 23 (Richard Sakwa ed., 2005).
101. CARLOTTA GALL & THOMAS DE WAAL, CHECHNYA: CALAMITY IN THE
CAUCASUS 77 (1998).
102. VICTKWN CHETERIAN, WAR AND PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS: ETHNIC CONFLICT
AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS 217–83 (2008).
103. SEELY, supra note 97, at 121.
104. LIEVEN, supra note 2, at 61.
105. Id.
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independence from the Russian Republic.”106 By one account, within
a few years, “Chechnya had turned into a Shakespearean kingdom—
armed groups roamed the country at will and there were no fixed
borders or front lines.”107
By mid-December 1994, after a number of Chechen and Russian
missteps, Russian troops were officially on the move and their
destination was Grozny, the capital of Chechnya.108 A journalistic
viewpoint offers that the first war started as Russia tried to restore
order by force and stem Chechen strides toward independence.109
One scholar adds that the proximate cause of the conflict “was the
rapid escalation of political turmoil and civil strife within Chechnya,
as well as the rapid escalation of the organised [sic] criminal activity
and terrorism spilling beyond its borders into neighbouring [sic]
republics.”110 Through a reading of these and other accounts, it is
clear a number of political, security and international concerns at the
regional and federal levels played a role in the conflagration.111 Given
this range of factors over time, it is also clear that Russia missed
opportunities to at least attempt to transform the conflict away from
violence.
Instead, Russia plunged the republic into a bloody struggle that
would last for nearly two years.112 During the ensuing war, Grozny
was devastated. Official, reliable government casualty reports are
virtually nonexistent.113 Alternatively, after a review of various
figures and sources, Dunlop estimates there were approximately
46,500 deaths in the first war.114 Nevertheless, war is about far more
than numbers—it is also about the impact on the humans left behind.
Gilligan found that “[c]ivilians recall being unprepared, shocked by
the indiscriminate bombing and the lack of warning to ensure safe
evacuation. Thousands of people abandoned the city, but thousands,

106. Soviet Union: Human Rights Developments, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-05.htm#P328_99935 (last visited Nov.
14, 2013).
107. GALL & DE WAAL supra note 101, at 137.
108. CHETERIAN, supra note 102, at 257.
109. See generally John-Christophe Peuch, Chechnya: Ten Years After—The
Logic Behind the First Chechen War, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 10,
2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056335.html.
110. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 81.
111. See also CHETERIAN, supra note 102; Dunlop, supra note 97.
112. See generally EVANGELISTA, supra note 96.
113. Alexander Cherkasov & Dmitry Grushkin, The Chechen Wars and Human
Rights in Russia, in CHECHNYA: FROM PAST TO FUTURE 131, 139 (Richard Sakwa ed.,
2005).
114. Dunlop, supra note 97, at 338.
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especially elderly Russians and Chechens, were stranded in
Grozny.”115 A longer-term political consequence was also evident:
prior to the start of the war, Grozny hosted a significant population of
ethnic Russians (as opposed to ethnic Chechens) as well as a
“Chechen professional class,” a university, and other institutes of
intellectual as well as artistic importance.116
Thus, Grozny’s
destruction undermined settlement because Russia eliminated “the
very constituency of Chechnya’s residents who were most
sympathetic to political accommodation with Russia and who also
were agents of modernization inside society. At a stroke Russia’s
bombers set back Chechnya two generations, from an urbanized
republic with an educated elite to a rural village economy.”117
While Grozny and other parts of Chechnya were destroyed, it was
Russia that emerged defeated at the end of the conflict.118 A number
of incidents factored into the conclusion of this first war. Although
the following, select incidents are not exhaustive, they are illustrative
of a broad set of factors that led to the initial drawdown of hostilities.
First, the personal experiences of the leaders were key, and a lack of
empathy impeded settlement.119 For example, in April 1996 Dudaev
was assassinated in a Russian missile attack.120 The Chechen leader
had been a proverbial thorn in Yeltsin’s side and his death was said to
make the cessation of overt hostilities more politically palatable.121
Second, the Russians underestimated the Chechen military abilities
and overestimated their own.122 This was strikingly evident when
Chechen militants garnered a series of victories (from their
perspective), including the surprising (to some) retaking of Grozny in
August of 1996.123 Finally, external intervention, in the right
115. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 26.
116. Tom de Waal, Chechnya: The Breaking Point, in CHECHNYA: FROM PAST TO
FUTURE 181, 182–83 (Richard Sakwa ed., 2005).
117. Id. at 183.
118. See LIEVEN, supra note 2, at 1–2.
119. See generally JAMES HUGHES, CHECHNYA FROM NATIONALISM TO JIHAD 56–
93 (2007). Note, Hughes, in chapter three, debunks the idea of a clash of
personalities thesis as causal. He focuses on more of an issues-based analysis, with
which this author agrees. The point here is not that contrasting personalities caused
the war, but rather impeded its transformation. On this point, he refers to
Starovoitova, who wrote of Yeltsin’s “‘psychological distance’ from the Chechens,
which made it difficult for him to treat them as equal partners in negotiations.” Id. at
58.
120. LIEVEN, supra note 2, at 144.
121. Id.; see Cornell, supra note 2, at 170 (“Personal enmity between Dudayev and
Yeltsin further made any serious negotiations futile.”).
122. See, e.g., SCHAEFER, supra note 2.
123. Gakaev, supra note 100 at 29.
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circumstances, helped: the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) sponsored negotiations that led to an interim
accord and treaty.124 Had Russia better understood the Chechen
context, all of these issues could have been dealt with differently
before 1996, before tens of thousands of Russians and Chechens were
killed and even more had their lives profoundly altered.
The Khasavyurt accords paused the killing and brutality, but did
not bring peace, let alone a sustainable end to violence in
Chechnya.125 Rather it provided a respite, during which Russia
regrouped before a brutal second military engagement.126 Chechnya
was physically and economically distraught, and for some, lawlessness
became the norm.127 It also grappled with the politicization and
manipulation of Islam. As the various militant “groups had no source
of employment and eventually formed a political opposition to the
government. [Chechen leader Aslan] Maskhadov invited members of
the radical political opposition . . . into his government and adopted
elements of their program to forge an illusion of national unity.”128
Shamil Basayev was part of Chechnya’s radical resistance, and he
was part of Maskhadov’s government, serving from April 1997 to July
1999, first as deputy prime minister then as acting prime minister.129
He was also the most infamous of his lot.130 Basayev was allegedly
responsible for some of the more notorious Chechen attacks in
Russia.131 These included an attack on a hospital at Budyonnovsk (in
neighboring Stavropol Krai). In June of 2005, Basayev led a group of
militants who stormed the hospital and took more than 1000 hostages,
include many women and children.132 The siege persisted despite

124. HUGHES, supra note 119, at 89–93.
125. The agreement is formally known as On the Principles for Determining the
Bases of Bilateral Relations. See id. at 92–93; Liz Fuller, Chechnya: Khasavyurt
Accords Failed to Preclude a Second War, RFE/RL (Aug. 30, 2006)
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070939.html.
126. See generally, SCHAEFER, supra note 2.
127. Id. at 179; EVANGELISTA, supra note 96, at 105.
128. Miriam Lanskoy, Chechnya’s Internal Fragmentation, 1996–1999, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 185, 187 (2003).
129. Robert Bruce Ware, A Multitude of Evils: Mythology and Political Failure in
Chechnya, in CHECHNYA FROM PAST TO FUTURE 79, 81 (Richard Sakwa ed., 2005)
130. Shamil Basayev, a Chechen Warlord, Died on July 10th, Aged 41, ECONOMIST
(July 13, 2006), http://www.economist.com/node/7160644.
131. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 119, at 153-57.
132. Sergei Shargorodsky, Troops Attack Hospital Where More than 1,000
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1995,
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Held,
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1995/Troops-Attack-Hospital-Where-More-Than-1000-Hostages-Held/id-05fbd6464cd8ea7cd79c14f54c986c8a.
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Russian military assaults on the hospital, which actually killed and
wounded several of the hostages.133
Ultimately, the Russian
government directly negotiated with Basayev, the remaining hostages
were released, and the militants were permitted to return to
Chechnya.134
The second, and better-known attack was the
aforementioned school siege at Beslan in North Ossetia, where more
than a thousand were held hostage, and hundreds perished, including
many children.135 Clearly what happens in Chechnya does not stay in
Chechnya, as Basayev took the war to the Russians. Notably, he is
also imputed with taking the war to Dagestan, where an onslaught of
violence was subsequently unleashed. 136
Approximately one month before invading Dagestan, Shamil
Basayev resigned from Mashkadov’s government.137 Importantly,
Basayev’s actions did not necessarily cause the second Chechen war,
but rather helped create a context in which Russia could justify its
subsequent actions.
Basayev’s incursions into Dagestan were
purportedly undertaken to create a trans-Caucasian mountain state;
however, he and his melee of militants were pushed back by Russian
forces as a new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, was chosen to lead
Russia for the first time in 1999.138 Basayev’s efforts and the Russian
state’s response were also juxtaposed against a series of apartment
bombings that took place in cities around the country. Those
bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, and remain mired in
speculation about the perpetrators.139 Basayev’s true aims in invading
Dagestan, given the relative size and capacity of his forces and the
fact that local Dagestanis rose up against him, remain a bit of a
mystery.140

133. Id.
134. HUGHES, supra note 119, at 156.
135. Walsh et al., supra note 70.
136. EVANGELISTA, supra note 96, at 46–47.
137. Id.
138. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 31–32; SEELY, supra note 97, at 306–07.
139. See HUGHES, supra note 119, at 110; WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 126–
27. Political violence in Dagestan predated Basayev’s invasion; however, his actions
and the Russian response altered local and regional dynamics, which exacerbated
Dagestani violence.
140. SVANTE CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS AND GREAT POWERS—A STUDY OF
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 272 (2004).
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to Moscow

Less mysterious, but perhaps more complex, is Dagestan’s related
descent into religious and political violence. Moscow’s failure to
connect the dots between Dagestani internal politics, Putin’s
centralization efforts, the Chechen conflagrations, and the
development of “indigenous” Dagestani violence, have not only
precluded meaningful solutions, but have also increased insecurity
and violence.
The first missed connection relates to Basayev’s incursion and the
local response. When the militants invaded, many in the Republic
turned toward Moscow and the military, rather than their purported
liberators, some of whom embraced a particular approach to Islam
termed Wahhabism.141 Dagestan rejected the militants partly because
“Wahhabis were generally viewed as aligned with Chechen invaders
and because the Wahhabis had attempted to import an alien ideology
with foreign assistance.”142 Importantly, however, in the interwar
years, clashes occurred in Dagestan between “traditionalist Muslims
and ‘Wahhabis.’”143 Wahhabism can be viewed as an austere form of
Islam, which was at odds with local Dagestani practice.144 In Russia,
the term Wahhabi has been erroneously used, demonizing Muslims,
often rendering it (and them) synonymous with Islamic terrorism.145
Esposito adds that “[g]overnments [broadly] find the label ‘Wahhabi’
especially useful because it implies a foreign source for indigenous
problems and equates their political opposition with an ‘Islamic
threat.’”146 In Dagestan, the Makhachkala government reacted to the
idea of a Wahhabi threat by outlawing Wahhabism.147 Ware adds that
“[o]rdinary Wahhabis were viewed as traitors and pariahs, and

141. See generally WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25.
142. Id. at 124.
143. Robert Bruce Ware, et al., Political Islam in Dagestan, 55 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
287, 289 (2003), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0966813032000055886.
144. See Robert Bruce Ware, Why Wahhabism Went Wrong in Dagestan, CACI
ANALYST (Sept. 13, 2000), http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/269.
145. See Expert Mulls Status of Islamic Communities, Wahhabism in Russia, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 9, 2013, available at LexisNexis; Olga Kuznetsova et
al., Chechen Wahhabis Aid Militants in Syria, RUSDATA—DIALINE RUSSIAN PRESS
DIGEST, July 31, 2013, available at LexisNexis; Terror Threat Remains High in
Russia’s North Caucasus—Antiterrorism Committee, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, June 25, 2013 available at LexisNexis.
146. JOHN ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 111 (2002).
147. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 152.
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Wahhabi leaders were arrested or driven into hiding.”148 The head of
the Memorial human rights organization acknowledged the religious
orientation of the conflict and added that “[f]undamentalist Islam is
the ideology of the underground. But far from everyone professing
unconventional Islam in Dagestan is a terrorist. Unfortunately, the
authorities in Dagestan fail to see the difference.”149
This
demonization has helped fuel marginalization, additional human
rights violations, including forced disappearances, and insecurity.150
Marginalization and human rights violations have not been
restricted to Dagestan. Back in Chechnya, Russia’s policies of
“Chechenization,” the installation of the Kadyovs as successive
presidents (Aslan until his assassination in 2003, followed soon
thereafter by his son Ramzan, in power as of this writing), and the
death of key militant leaders helped tamp down violent resistance
within Chechnya, albeit at a horrific cost.151 Torture, forced
disappearances, kidnapping, and other forms of brutality became
Chechnya’s new normal.152 For example, between 3000 and 5000 were
disappeared in Chechnya between 1999 and 2005.153 Several years
later, in 2009, Tanya Lokshina, the veteran Human Rights Watch
advocate, wrote about
families whose houses had been burned down because they were
accused of having a family member among the rebels hiding in the
mountains. The only conclusion you can make after looking at the
striking pattern of burnings is that government forces were
responsible for them. At first the families had been warned—please
get your relatives out of the woods and bring them to us, or there
will be trouble. Serious trouble. You raised them, so you are
responsible for them.154

148. Ware, supra note 143.
149. Murder of Dagestani Minister is Indication of Existence of Extremist
Underground in Republic, RUSSIA & CIS MILITARY WKLY., June 11, 2009 available
at 2009 WLNR 12135559.
150. See Tanya Lokshina, ‘Wahhabi’ Village in Dagestan, OPENDEMOCRACY (June
9, 2009), http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/wahhabi-village-in-dagestan.
151. See id.; see also Vesselin Popovski, Terrorizing Civilians as a ‘Counterterrorist Operation’: Crimes and Impunity in Chechnya, 7 SOUTHEAST EUR. & BLACK
SEA STUD., 431, 433 (2007).
152. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 82-94.
153. Id.
154. Tanya Lokshina, Ending Chechnya’s Counterterrorism Operation—or Not,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/27/endingchechnya-s-counterterrorism-operation-or-not.
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Going into the woods or the forest has become a euphemism for
joining the militants.155 Importantly, going into the forest is also a
choice, and choices are made in a context.
Part of that context is created by state and state-sanctioned
brutality, which has not respected the North Caucasian borders. The
Dagestanis have correspondingly known horrific violence, also at the
hands of federal and republic-level authorities as well as militants.
Statistics paint a grim picture: in 2012, 405 were killed and nearly 300
wounded in conflict related violence.156 In 2011, 413 died and more
than 400 were injured, again in conflict related violence. In 2012
there were 53 “explosions and terror acts,” while 86 occurred in
2011.157 In 2009, the same year Lokshina wrote of Chechen house
burnings, in Dagestan, “427 persons died or suffered” in conflictrelated incidents.158 O’Loughlin asserts the violence in Dagestan and
other neighboring republics is “due to Russia’s heavy-handed
counter-insurgency
techniques,
entrenched
corruption
and
government ineffectiveness, and a pervasive lack of economic
development and grim employment prospects for young men.”159
Russia is not necessarily causing militant violence, but rather has a
key role in creating a context in which some might make a choice to
go into the forest, when under different circumstances, they would
have been quite content to stay at home.
Analyses of those who do join the forest dwellers tend to focus on
the Chechen war and its relation to broader North Caucasian
violence. It has further honed in on “a loose network of formally
autonomous violent groups, or Islamic jamaats” that subsequently
sprung up in the region.160 There has been a range of nonstate actors
at work, wreaking havoc and causing violence, including Shariat
Jamaat and the oft-cited Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, or
Caucasus Emirate.161
155. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12 at 88.
156. In 2012, 1225 Persons Suffered in the Course of the Armed Conflict in
Northern Caucasus, CAUCASIAN KNOT (Jan. 21, 2013), http://eng.kavkazuzel.ru/articles/23821/?print=true.
157. Id.
158. Counterterrorism in Dagestan: 15 CTOs in 2009, CAUCASIAN KNOT (Jan. 12,
2010), http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/12199.
159. John O’Loughlin, et al., The Changing Geography of Violence in Russia’s

North Caucasus, 1999-2011: Regional Trends and Local Dynamics in Dagestan,
Ingushetia and Karbadino-Balkaria, 52 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 596, 597
(2011).
160. Domitilla Sagramoso, Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus,
83 INT’L AFF. 681, 681 (2007).
161. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 1.
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Shariat Jamaat has stated it was founded in 1999;162 however, it
really entered the spotlight with a series of attacks in 2004 and 2005.163
The Jamestown Foundation assessed that the organization was in fact
the “direct successor” of a group allegedly dismantled by Putin in
1999. The Foundation noted that “it is one more example of how
inefficient a military response is for suppressing an ideological
opponent.
It is possible to destroy bases, to destroy active
participants, but it is quite impossible to destroy an underlying
ideology using tanks and planes.”164 In early 2005 the group “stepped
up its activities” under the leadership of Rasul Maksharipov, an
ethnic Avar and veteran of the Chechen wars, unleashing scores of
attacks that killed dozens of police officers.165 In March of that year,
Shariat released a hit list of intended targets, including government
and security officials at the federal and republic levels.166 By 2008, the
International Crisis Group reported, “it is increasingly clear that such
groups—Shariat Jamaat being the best known—not only persist but
are playing an ever larger role in the escalating street war” that was
plaguing Dagestan.167
The Caucasus Emirate is likely the most well-known of the groups,
particularly outside of the region. Its leader, Dokka Umarov,
proclaimed its existence in the fall of 2007 and called for a
reconquering of historic Muslim lands.168 He stated, “I don’t think
that it is necessary to draw the borders of the Caucasus Emirate,” but
proceeded to include Dagestan and Karbadino-Balkaria (a
neighboring republic), amongst others.169
The Shariat Jamaat
apparently pledged loyalty to Umarov and his pan-Caucasian efforts

162. See id. at 9.
163. See Extremist Groups Gaining Power in North Caucasus—Russian
Newspaper, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 4, 2005, available at LexisNexis.
164. Mairbek Vatchagaev, The Dagestani Jamaat, 8 N. CAUCASUS ANALYSIS 1, 3
(2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/125878102/Chronique-Du-CaucaseNo-1-March-2011.
165. Liz Fuller, Daghestan’s Islamic Fighters Continue to Hone Military, PR Skills,
RFE/RL
(Jan.
27,
2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/Daghestan_Islamic_Fighters_Hone_Military_PR_Skills/
1375350.html.
166. Dagestani Militants Plan ‘Systematic’ Killing of 140 Russian Officers, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 8, 2005, available at LexisNexis.
167. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 8.
168. See The Official Version of Amir Dokka’s Statement of Declaration of the
Caucasian
Emirate,
KAVKAZ
CTR.
(Nov.
22,
2007),
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml.
169. Id.
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in late November 2007.170 Analysts observed that this “recent
statement of support . . . suggests an expanding political agenda.”171
Separatist Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev responded to Umarov’s
declaration, stating in part:
The very proclamation of an emirate, even a verbal one, would help
the Russian leadership to mobilize even more forces to carry out the
genocide of the peoples of the North Caucasus, who are even more
vigorously calling for their ethnic and religious rights. A “North
Caucasian Emirate” would play a provocative role, one which was
once played by the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and
Dagestan, which contributed towards the second invasion by
Russian troops of Chechnya.172

Provocation has also come in the form of attacks emanating from
the Caucasus Emirate, Shariat and other nonstate actors, which have
focused on the police and security forces. These groups have also
targeted regional religious leaders and transportation targets around
Russia. For example, in June 2005, Shariat claimed responsibility for
the deaths of ten Russian soldiers in Makhachkala.173 By 2007, it was
targeting religious leaders and murdered a deputy mufti,
Kurbangomed Ramazanov, also in the capital city.174 As 2008 wound
down, General Valery Lipinsky, a Russian Interior Ministry official
and leader of its forces there, was shot in Makhachkala and later died;
others were wounded.175 The Dagestani Minister of the Interior,
Adilgerey Magomedtagirov, was killed in the region’s capital, as he
left a wedding in June 2009.176 At the end of March 2010, two
Dagestani women detonated explosive devices, within an hour of
each other, in separate Moscow metro stations. The attacks killed
dozens and wounded scores.177 At the same time, attacks in Kizlyar
170. Radical Islamic Group in Russia’s Dagestan Loyal to Rebel Chechen Leader,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Nov. 15, 2007, available at LexisNexis.
171. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 41, at 8.
172. Chechen Rebel Foreign Minister Warns of Moscow Plot against Caucasus
Peoples, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 17, 2007, available at LexisNexis.
173. Islamic Group Claims Responsibility for Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 4.
174. See Rebels Claim Responsibility for Killing of Senior Cleric in Russia’s
Dagestan, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 29, 2007, available at LexisNexis;
Two Including Dagestani Deputy Mufti Die in Car Blast, INTERFAX (July 27, 2007),
http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=3394.
175. General Wounded in Makhachkala Attack Dies, RUSSIA & CIS GEN.
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 29, 2008, available at LexisNexis.
176. Dagestan Interior Minister Murder Linked to Presidential Election—Paper,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, June 9, 2009, available at LexisNexis.
177. See Luke Harding, My Daughter the Terrorist: What Made Village
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(Dagestan) left at least a dozen people dead, including nine police
officers. In May 2012, more than ten were killed and scores wounded
in a dual-pronged attack on police and emergency services in
Makhachkala. The first targeted a police station; the second, the
rescue and investigative personnel who arrived on the scene.178
One attack the militants specifically disavowed was the Boston
Marathon bombing in April 2013. The “Command of the Province of
Dagestan” was very careful in distancing itself from any connection
with attack.179 It issued a statement clearly highlighting Russia as the
enemy and also noting Umarov’s order against striking civilian targets
outside the region.180 However, by the summer of 2013, this order was
rescinded.181 Umarov had set his sights, literally, on the 2014 winter
Olympics in Sochi, an area near the North Caucasus.182 He stated,
They (Russia) plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our
ancestors, on the bones of many, many dead Muslims, buried on the
territory of our land on the Black Sea, and we as mujahideen are
obliged to not permit that, using any methods allowed us by the
almighty Allah . . . . I call on you, every mujahid, either in Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan or on the territory of the Caucasus to use maximum
force on the path of Allah to disrupt this Satanic dancing on the
bones of our ancestors.183

C.

Wars and Peace?

The motivations and justifications for much of the militant violence
in Dagestan are fairly clear. Richardson notes,
By far the most common motive for their actions asserted by current
terrorists and former terrorists of every ideological hue from every
part of the world is the desire to exact revenge. Sometimes this is
revenge for something they or their family suffered, often it is

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/19/dagestan-suicide-bombers-terrorismrussia.
178. Dagestan Bombings Highlight Security Shortfalls, DEUTSCHE WELLE EUR.,
May 4, 2012, available at LexisNexis.
179. See Statement of the Command of Mujahideen of Caucasus Emirate’s
Dagestan Province in Relation to Events in Boston, KAVKAZ CTR. (Apr. 21, 2013),
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2013/04/21/17679.shtml.
180. Id.
181. Assessing the Terrorist Threat Against Sochi, MOSCOW NEWS, July 16, 2013,
http://themoscownews.com/russia/20130716/191771837/Assessing-the-terrorist-threatagainst-Sochi.html.
182. Id.
183. Grove, supra note 10.
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revenge for a wrong inflicted on the community with which they
identify.184

This was echoed in the Umarov’s words above about the Olympics.
It is also seen in other statements, such as Shariat Jamaat’s repeated
references to the state as the oppressor, to the torture of Dagestanis.
The group stated,
In response to murders and persecutions of Muslims, Dagestani
Mujahideen are striking back and eliminating the butchers from
punitive structures of the Makhachkala pro-Moscow regime. And at
the same time they are trying to explain their actions to the
population and call on the local authorities to give up the policies of
tyranny and violence towards Muslims.185

The aforementioned attacks are just the tip of the proverbial
iceberg and more are likely to come. In the wake of a bombing
attack, a journalist observed, “In Dagestan, where male
unemployment is estimated at around 80 percent, and polls show
virtually no support for the Kremlin-installed local leaders, the
outlook appears grim.”186
In sum, Moscow, Grozny and
Makhachkala have failed to meaningfully address the contexts that
have generated regional and local grievances. Instead, wars have
been waged, citizens demonized for their beliefs, lives destroyed, and
the peoples’ hopes for a peaceful Dagestan, all but destroyed.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS: FROM MOSCOW TO
MAKHACHKALA
Moscow’s failures to address the contextual factors of governance
and militant violence, is interconnected with its unwillingness to
meaningfully acknowledge that a peaceful Makhachkala is dependent
on respect for human rights. Pointedly, there is a profound
disconnect between Russia’s obligations in this regard and the actual
situation in Dagestan. After the twin attacks on the Moscow subways
and the killings in the republic, then-President Dmitry Medvedev
stated, “The measures to fight terrorism should be expanded, they

184. LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT 4 (2007) (on file with
author).
185. Leaflets, Weapons of Mujahideen, KAVKAZ CTR. (May 25, 2004),
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2004/05/25/2820.shtml.
186. Fred Weir, Russia Islamist Network Takes Shape as Caucasus Hit by Another
Terrorism Attack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 5, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
7558398.
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should be more effective, more harsh, more cruel.”187 In March 2011,
journalist Mark Franchetti, referring to state counterterrorism efforts
in the North Caucasus, averred that “the Russians have responded
with the ruthless tactics they honed during the last Chechen war.
Suspected militants are often abducted, tortured and executed in
‘extrajudicial” killings.’”188 As this section reveals, however, alleged
militants are not the only ones victimized.
In Moscow and the North Caucasus, there are scores of individuals
on the literal and figurative front lines, reporting about government
misconduct and spotlighting state abuses.189 Many have been
subjected to threats and intimidation, some have been victims of
violence and dozens have been murdered.190 A few of these cases
have gained international attention.191 Violence targeting these
individuals raises serious concerns about the Russian government,
including direct state involvement; the failure to protect known or
likely targets; and the insufficient investigation and prosecution of
alleged perpetrators. While the cases in Dagestan (let alone the
North Caucasus) are too numerous to explore herein, a review of
select incidents highlights a critical aspect of the conflict context, with
sustained ramifications long after the last bullet is fired or bomb
exploded.
This section first explores Russia’s commitment to human rights,
then examines targeted attacks, first on journalists, then on human

187. Arsen Mollayev, Russian President Promises ‘Crueler’ Measures in Fighting
TORONTO
STAR,
Apr.
1,
2010,
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2010/04/01/russias_president_promises_crueler_
measures_in_fighting_terrorism.html.
188. Mark Franchetti, Special Forces Blitz ‘Sparked Moscow Blast,’ SUNDAY
TIMES
(London),
Jan.
30
2011,
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Europe/article527054.ece.
189. See
Human
Rights
Work
of
“Memorial”,
MEMORIAL,
http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2013); see also
Anna Politkovskaya, J’accuse—Her Own Death Foretold, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/14/AR2006101400805.html.
190. See AMNESTY INT’L, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: RULE WITHOUT LAW: HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS (2009); 56 Journalists Killed in Russia
Since 1992/Motive Confirmed, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS,
http://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013); World Report 2012:
Russia, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report2012-russia (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
191. See e.g., C.J. Chivers, A Fearless Activist in a Land of Thugs, N.Y. TIMES, July
17,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/world/europe/18estemirova.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0; see also ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA, IS JOURNALISM WORTH DYING FOR? (2007).
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rights defenders. These subparts emphasize events in Dagestan, but
also take a wider angle to view the situation across Russia.
A. Russia’s Rhetorical Commitment to Human Rights
Russia’s rhetorical commitment to human rights looks quite good
on paper, particularly at the international level, where it has ratified
or acceded to a number of key treaties. Included therein are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights or ECHR).192 While a plethora of
violations are raised in the case studies below, there are several key
rights around which abuses are centered: the right to life, freedom
from arbitrary detention, freedom from torture and inhumane
treatment, and freedom of opinion and expression.
Article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates, “Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”193 This is considered a
foundational right. Derogation is not permitted, even in times of
emergency.194 The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which oversees
implementation of the ICCPR, affirms that it is the “supreme right,”
and it “should not be interpreted narrowly.”195 Moreover, states have
a positive obligation to ensure the fulfillment of the rights contained
therein and that a failure “to take appropriate measures or to exercise
due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm
caused by such acts by private persons or entities” could be construed

192. See Chapter IV Human Rights—3. International Covenant on Civil and
UN
TREATY
COLLECTION,
Political
Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 16, 2013); Simplified Chart of
Signatures
and
Ratifications,
COUNCIL
EUR.,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?MA=3&CM=16&
CL=ENG (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
193. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
194. Id.
195. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment 6,
available
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Right
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(Apr.
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1982),
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ndocument.
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as a violation.196 Also at the U.N. level, there is a Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.197 In 2003, as per
its mandate, the Special Rapporteur requested a country visit to
Russia, with follow-up requests the subsequent two years.198 The
ECHR, Article 2(l) also affirms the right to life, and provides for
nonderogation (Article 15).199 Finally, Article 20 of the Russian
constitution provides, “Everyone shall have the right to life.”200
Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the ECHR prohibit
torture. There is a treaty specifically dedicated to protecting people
from this most egregious of violations: the Convention against
Torture and Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.201 This convention provides for a broad understanding
of torture and ill treatment, and stipulates that states must take
measures to prevent torture and hold those who so engage
accountable.202 The Committee against Torture affirms its nonderogable nature and states that special circumstances do not justify
such treatment, including
a state of war or threat thereof, internal political instability or any
other public emergency. This includes any threat of terrorist acts or
violent crime as well as armed conflict, international or noninternational. The Committee is deeply concerned at and rejects
absolutely any efforts by States to justify torture and ill-treatment as
a means to protect public safety or avert emergencies in these and
all other situations.203

196. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General
Legal Obligations on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004).
197. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions—
OFFICE
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HUM.
RTS.,
Introduction,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
198. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions—
Country Visits, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/visits.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
199. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 2, art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
200. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20
(Russ.).
201. See generally U.N. General Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46
(Dec. 10, 1984).
202. Id. For the meaning of torture, see Article 1; for criminal jurisdiction and
prosecution, see especially Articles 4–7; training and review of practices and
procedures are addressed in Articles 10 and 11.
203. U.N. Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2., ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
no. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).
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In their 2012 concluding comments, in response to Russia’s
periodic report, the Committee was, “concerned at numerous,
ongoing and consistent reports of serious human rights abuses
inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence
of public officials or other persons acting in official capacities in the
northern Caucasus.”204 Beyond the treaty structure, there is also a
Special Rapporteur on Torture, who has had a pending visit request
to Russia, with regard to Chechnya, since 2000.205 Domestically,
Article 21 of the Russian constitution prohibits “torture, violence, or
other severe or humiliating treatment or punishment.”206
The rights to “liberty and security of person” and the prohibition
against “arbitrary arrest and detention,” are contained in Article 9 of
the ICCPR.207 In 2009, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed
concern
about ongoing reports of torture and ill-treatment, enforced
disappearance, arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial killing and secret
detention in . . . the North Caucasus committed by the military,
security services and other State agents, and that the authors of such
violations appear to enjoy widespread impunity due to a systematic
lack of effective investigation and prosecution.208

There is also a U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
which has lodged a request to visit Russia.209 The right to liberty and
security of person is guaranteed under Article 5 of the European

204. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic
Report of the Russian Federation, Adopted by the Committee at Its Forty-Ninth
Session., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/RUS/CO/5 (Dec. 11, 2012).
205. See Country Visits, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Torture/SRTorture/Pages/Visits.aspx (last visited
Nov. 14, 2013).
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175.
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Rights Committee—Russian Federation, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov.
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Convention.210 Article 22 of the Russian constitution stipulates that
detention exceeding forty-eight hours requires a court order.211
Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR guarantees “freedom of expression,”
which includes the freedom “to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print.”212 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has noted,
“Freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of
the principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn,
essential for the promotion and protection of human rights.”213
Towards that end, it emphasizes the need for “[a] free, uncensored
and unhindered press or other media.”214 This emphasis speaks to the
interdependence of human rights, which is critical in understanding
the size and complexity of the web of violations taking place in
Dagestan. In other words, if people are killed, tortured, or unjustly
imprisoned by the state, this right helps ensure that their suffering
and that of their families is not muted by the state. It allows a
spotlight to be shined on violators, who otherwise could operate
under cover of political and legal darkness and with impunity. A
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression
emphasizes the importance of this right through country visits,
reports, and the transmission of urgent appeals to states.215 Here too,
a country visit has been requested of Russia.216 Article 10 of the
European Convention also protects these rights. Finally, Article 29 of

210. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art.
5,
Nov.
4,
1950,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collection_Convention_1950_eng.pdf.
211. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22
(Russ.).
212. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 193, art.
19(2), at 178.
213. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34—Article 19:
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General Remarks, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
214. Id.
215. See generally Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/OpinionIndex.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2013).
216. See Freedom of Opinion and Expression—Country Visits, OFFICE UN HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Visits.aspx (last visited Oct.
17, 2013).
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the Russian constitution requires a free media, exhorts freedom of
opinion and expression and prohibits censorship.217
These legal commitments notwithstanding, journalists and human
rights defenders, along with their families and communities, have
suffered because of state action and inaction. State violence and a
related accountability gap for crimes committed against them
perpetuates local insecurity, fueling grievances and increasing the
socio-political space between Moscow and Makhachkala, as well as
between Makhachkala and Dagestan’s citizens.
B.

Silencing Truth: Targeting Journalists

On July 9, 2013, Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, the deputy editor
of Novoye Delo, an independent newsweekly in Dagestan, was shot
and killed in a suburb of Makhachkala.218 The Russian Investigative
Committee for Dagestan said, “[T]he main version of the murder is
related to his professional activities as a journalist.”219
Akhmednabiyev reported on “extrajudicial kidnappings by local
security forces, human rights violations during counterterrorism
operations, and pressure against Muslim organizations.”220 For
example, in June 2011, (harkening to the aforementioned governance
issue), he wrote that corruption provided a context in which people
more easily joined the militants, and that the Russian state used the
North Caucasus as a national distraction to avoid dealing with other
issues.221 His name had been on an anonymously authored hit list that
surfaced several years ago.222 Those on this list were allegedly
assisting militants and criminals and therefore responsible for the
deaths of security officials.223 Human rights NGOs and others raised
questions about the state’s failure to protect Akhmednabiyev, given
the threats made (and the fact that a prior attempt had been made on

217. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 29
(Russ.).
218. See Dagestani Journalist’s Death Linked to Job—Russian Police, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 9, 2013, available at LexisNexis.
219. Id.
220. Andrew Roth, Russia: Crusading Editor is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013,
available at LexisNexis.
221. See Russia: Dagestani Press Selection List 10 Jun 11, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, June 23, 2011, available at LexisNexis.
222. Andrew Roth, Journalist Assassinated in Violent Russian Republic, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 16659164.
223. See Russian Press Review—2, ITAR-TASS, July 10, 2013, available at
LexisNexis.
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his life).224 For example, Reporters Without Borders stated, “In many
attacks and murders, the local and federal authorities have
unfortunately not always shown the necessary determination to put
an end to violence against journalists.”225 In terms of consequences,
the NGO Article 19 noted, “His killing compounds the already unsafe
environment for journalists in Dagestan and will undoubtedly cause
journalists to further self-censor. The killing of Akhmednabiyev is
the intentional silencing of one of the few voices speaking out about
human rights violations in Dagestan.”226
Just a little more than a year and a half prior, Ghadzhimurad
Kamalov, who founded the Dagestani paper Chernovik (which
covered similar, difficult topics such as corruption and enforced
disappearances) was murdered.227 Kamalov was on the same hit list as
Akhmednabiyev. He was also killed in a hail of bullets in
Makhachkala, in December 2011.228 Kamalov wrote, “People look at
the way that the police and the FSB [security service] behave, and it’s
easy to understand why a lot of them feel their sympathies are with
the other side, with the insurgents.”229 Although the police started an
investigation into his death, an editor of Chernovik predicted that
investigative journalism would suffer as a result of Kamalov’s murder
and that their “many appeals to Moscow have received no response.
The federal security forces and authorities have shown no interest in
solving the murders of journalists in Dagestan.”230

224. See Russia: Journalist Akhmednabiyev Killed After Authorities Fail to
Protect,
ARTICLE
19
(July
9,
2013),
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37151/en/russia:-journalistakhmednabiyev-killed-after-authorities-fail-to-protect.
225. Dagestan Journalist’s Investigative Work Holds Key to His Murder,
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 9, 2013), http://en.rsf.org/russia-dagestanjournalist-s-09-07-2013,44913.html.
226. Russia: Journalist Akhmednabiyev Killed After Authorities Fail to Protect,
supra note 224.
227. Russian Press Review—2, supra note 223.
228. See Tom Parfitt & Miriam Elder, Corruption—Fighting Journalist Shot Dead

in Russia: Newspaper Founder had Been on ‘Execution List’—Insurgency and
Violence on the Rise in Republic, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 17, 2011, available at
LexisNexis.
229. Shaun Walker, Dagestan: Russia’s Islamic Enemy Within, INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dagestanrussias-islamic-enemy-within-2107150.html.
230. Leading Independent Journalist Gunned Down in Dagestan, REPORTERS
WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 16, 2011), http://en.rsf.org/russia-leading-independentjournalist-16-12-2011,41562.html.
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The targeting of journalists is not a recent phenomenon. Another
Novoye Delo reporter was gunned down in June of 2005.231
Magomedzagid Varisov was a journalist and a political analyst.232 He
had been threatened and believed he was followed prior to his
murder.233 He also “had unsuccessfully sought help from the local
police.”234
Varisov was said to be “very critical of the . . .
opposition”235 and “extremely critical of the authorities.”236 He had
accused the opposition of trying to destabilize Dagestan and of
“stir[ring] up hatred between the Chechen and Dagestani
communities,” to their own advantage.237 Shariat Jamaat reportedly
claimed responsibility for his death.238 However, Reporters Without
Borders called for an “immediate investigation to identify both
perpetrators and instigators and bring them to justice.”239
Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, Ghadzhimurad Kamalov, and
Magomedzagid Varisov are just three of the seventeen journalists
who have been murdered in Dagestan.240 In 2013, The Moscow Times
reported, “Dagestan is widely seen as the most dangerous part of
Russia for journalists to work.”241 And it is situated in an equally
hazardous environment, as Human Rights Watch asserts that “[t]he
North Caucasus region is one of the most dangerous places for
journalists in the world, and it is no wonder if law enforcement

231. See Ivan Sukhov, Killed for Thoughts, RUSDATA DIALINE—RUSSIAN PRESS
DIGEST, June 30, 2005, available at LexisNexis
232. Magomedzagid Varisov: Russia, 1 Killed, INT’L PRESS INST. (June 28, 2005),
http://www.freemedia.at/index.php?id=248&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=88&cHash
=8e6cbdbe1a.
233. Magomedzagid Varisov, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (June 28, 2005),
http://archives.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14467.
234. Ann Cooper, Violent Censorship, MOSCOW TIMES, July 7, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 10610537. Note that Cooper was writing on behalf of the Center to
Protect Journalists.
235. Agomedzagid Varisov, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, June 28, 2005,
http://cpj.org/killed/2005/magomedzagid-varisov.php.
236. Press Rights Institute Condemns Killing of Dagestani Journalist, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, July 5, 2005, available at LexisNexis.
237. Reporters Without Borders, Islamist Group Claims Responsibility for
IFEX,
July
5,
2005,
Journalist’s
Murder,
http://www.ifex.org/russia/2005/07/05/islamist_group_claims_responsibility/.
238. Djamaat Shariat: The Territory of Jihad Extends!, KAVKAZ CENTER (July 2,
2005), http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/07/02/3918.shtml.
239. Magomedzagid Varisov, supra note 233.
240. Journalist Shot Dead in Russia’s Dagestan Province, REUTERS, July 9, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-russia-dagestan-killingidUSBRE9680HQ20130709.
241. Yekaterina Kravtsova, Dagestani Journalist Gunned Down, MOSCOW TIMES,
July 10, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/482889.html.
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authorities aren’t doing their job.”242 Notably, the risks are not
restricted to the North Caucasus. Since 1993, the Committee to
Protect Journalists has catalogued the murder of nearly eighty
journalists across Russia, many of them in urban centers: the
aforementioned five in Makhachkala, eight in Grozny, and twentythree in Moscow.243 In 2006, The Irish Times published “Death List:
Prominent Russian Journalists Who Have Been Murdered,” which
was simply and tragically a catalogue of each journalist’s name,
journalistic outlet, and date and manner of death.244 Journalists were
kidnapped, beaten, stabbed, shot, and poisoned.245
Perhaps the most infamous murder was that of Anna
Politkovskaya, who reported for Novaya Gazeta.246 She had survived
a poisoning in 2004, while en route to the Beslan siege, before she was
shot in 2006.247 She was murdered as she returned home to her
apartment building in Moscow.248 She was an outspoken and
thoughtful critic of Russian government policies, particularly as they
related to Chechnya and the North Caucasus.249 Years after her
murder, Petros Garibyan, a state investigator into her death, said in
an interview that “the person who ordered this pursued not only
retaliation against Anna Politkovskaya for critical publications . . . he

242. Russia: Journalist Killed—Authorities Ignored Threats, Attacks Against Him,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 9, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/09/russiajournalist-killed; see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.23.pdf
(“ [T]he Special Rapporteur believes that States have a duty to carry out exhaustive
investigations into each case and to bring criminal charges against those responsible.
Failure to perform this duty creates a culture of impunity which perpetuates the
violence. Systematically allowing those responsible for killing journalists or social
communicators to go unpunished could be interpreted as tolerance or acquiescence
on the part of the State.”).
243. 56 Journalists Killed in Russia Since 1992/Motive Confirmed, supra note 190.
244. Death List: Prominent Russian Journalists Who Have Been Murdered, IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, available at LexisNexis.
245. Id.
246. Shaun Walker, Anna Politkovskaya: Death of a Professional,
OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 8, 2006), http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationinstitutions_government/politkovskaya_3979.jsp.
247. Id.; see Anna Politkovskaya, Poisoned by Putin, GUARDIAN (London), Sept.
9, 2004, available at LexisNexis.
248. Walker, supra note 246.
249. See generally POLITKOVSKAYA, supra note 191; ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA,
PUTIN’S RUSSIA (2004).
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[also] sought a demonstrative and resonant act aimed at intimidating
all of you—journalists—as well as society and the authorities.”250
All told, the number of murdered journalists is staggering, and they
reveal only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, albeit its most lethal
point.
Journalists have also been physically abused, verbally
harangued and threatened, and news outlets have been censored and
had their doors shuttered.251 In 2005, Ann Cooper, writing for the
Center to Protect Journalists, stated,
We seek justice in all of the cases of murdered journalists. The
reason is compelling: Without justice, this alarming pattern of
journalist murders is likely to continue, with terrible repercussions
for the media and for the Russian public. Without justice, selfcensorship intensifies, particularly in the broadcast media.
Reporting on basic public issues is increasingly restricted, and the
public is kept in the dark about corruption, crime and human rights
abuses.252

Sadly, little has changed in the intervening eight years as the
vicious cycle of murder and impunity for the perpetrators, be they
militants, criminals, or state-sanctioned killers, continues.
C.

Killing Hope: Human Rights Defenders in the Crosshairs

Human rights defenders have also come under rhetorical and
literal fire as they too have been threatened and killed.253 On January
20, 2012, Omar Saidmagomedov, a Dagestani lawyer, was shot and
killed along with Rasul Kurbanov, after police in Makhachkala
stopped them.254 The police alleged that Kurbanov fired first.255
Witnesses offer a different version of events, and human rights groups
suggest the murder was a state killing because Saidmagomedov

250. Anna Kordunsky, Russian Reporter’s Murder Was Meant as a Message,
Investigator Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, available at LexisNexis.
251. See generally REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, RUSSIAN CAUCASUS: REPORT
OF FACT-FINDING VISIT TO CHECHNYA AND DAGESTAN

(2011).
252. Cooper, supra note 234.
253. Lawyers in Dagestan Receive Death Threat, AMNESTY INT’L (June 4, 2013),
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR46/016/2013/en/e61a3b90-b52f-4e61-9d3edd8a74b865f2/eur460162013en.html.
254. Lawyer Mudunov Accuses Investigators of Falsifying Materials on
Saidmagomedov’s Murder in Makhachkala, CAUCASIAN KNOT, Apr. 16, 2012,
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/20757; Tanya Lokshina, Russia: Expert Testimony
on the Situation for Human Rights Defenders, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 26, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/26/russia-expert-testimony-situation-human-rightsdefenders.
255. Lawyer Mudunov Accuses Investigators of Falsifying Materials on
Saidmagomedov’s Murder in Makhachkala, supra note 254.
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sometimes defended those accused of militancy.256 His father, who
prepared his son’s body for religious burial, stated,
I counted 23 wounds from exploding bullets; they also made a
control shot. And then I was summoned for interrogation as a
witness; and they asked about the mosque that Omar visited. The
problem of Dagestan is that when Moscow orders to take off a hat,
Makhachkala readily takes off the hat together with the head.257

Magomed Guchuchaliev, another Dagestani lawyer was killed in
July 2013.258
His murder came swiftly on the heels of the
Akhmednabiev killing. Guchuchaliev headed his own law firm,
members of which “have been receiving threats in connection with
their professional activities, and have faced harassment by members
of the authorities.”259 The firm has defended those accused of
militancy, and its attorneys have appeared on the earlier mentioned
hit list.260 The head of the local bar association has accused the
authorities in his death. 261 He alleges the murder was a means of
pressuring his surviving son to testify in a case against Makhachkala’s
mayor, who fell out of favor with the Kremlin.262 In a submission to
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial killings and human rights
defenders, the Observatory for Human Rights Defenders noted it “is
also strongly concerned by the context of impunity in which these
crimes have occurred.”263
Sapiyat Mogomedova, a Dagestani lawyer, has faced charges she
has termed as “trumped up.”264 The charges against her are said to be
in retaliation for a complaint she filed against the police alleging the

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Another Lawyer Killed in Dagestan: The Russian Authorities Must Find
Magomed Guchuchaliev’s Killers and Bring them to Justice, AMNESTY INT’L (July 15,
2013), http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR46/030/2013/en/99556552-4de9-4520aa2e-eaf749202353/eur460302013en.html.
259. Id.
260. Russian Federation: Two Extrajudicial Killings in Three Days in Dagestan:
The Observatory Refers the Matter to United Nations Special Procedures, STATES
NEWS SERV., July 18, 2013, available at LexisNexis.
261. Russia: Dagestani Lawyer Blames Police for Murder of Colleague, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 2, 2013, available at LexisNexis.
262. Id.; see Makhachkala Mayor Arrested in Murder Investigation, RFE/RL
(June 2, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-daghestan-makhachkalamayor-arrested/25004594.html.
263. Russian Federation: Two Extrajudicial Killings in Three Days in Dagestan:
The Observatory Refers the Matter to United Nations Special Procedures, supra note
260.
264. Russia: Expert Testimony on the Situation for Human Rights Defenders,
supra note 254.
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police brutally beat her.265 Her case against the police was closed in
December of 2011 but Mogomedova was not notified until three
months later.266 An Amnesty International researcher stated,
Russian authorities . . . must also ensure that lawyers are free to
discharge their professional duties . . . . Lawyers will continue to
confront the system, but they have to do so safe in the knowledge
that they are not risking their lives or the lives of their relatives. All
past violations of lawyers’ rights must be investigated impartially
and effectively.267

Dagestani defenders are not likely holding their breath.
Magomedova states, “To say that I am not afraid would be wrong.
But it is a healthy sense of fear. Fright can either mobilize or
paralyze. I dare to hope that it mobilizes my strength.”268
Mothers of Dagestan for Human Rights (MDHR) is an
organization that knows about mobilization and fear.269 MDHR was
founded in 2007 by the mothers of the disappeared.270 In August
2009, MDHR’s offices in Makhachkala burned to the ground.
Reports differ as to the cause. One account says authorities initially
blamed an electrical malfunction, while another says “that gasoline
had been poured in the office and set on fire.”271 The NGO’s
chairperson said it was arson.272 She was concerned that authorities
may have set the fire in retaliation for a complaint she lodged with the
local prosecutor regarding “an attack on a Muslim shop.”273 The
organization has regularly reported on those who have been
kidnapped and disappeared, and also spoken out about other human

265. Id.
266. Russian

Federation: Update—Human Rights Defender Ms. Sapyiat
Magomedova Applies to Have Case Reopened, FRONT LINE DEFENDERS (June 14,
2013), http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/23078.
267. Claire Bigg, In North Caucasus, Lawyers ‘Under Attack’, RADIO FREE EUR.,
Mar. 21, 2013, available at LexisNexis.
268. Sapiyat Magomedova, CIVIL RTS. DEFENDERS (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.civilrightsdefenders.org/uncategorized/human-rights-defender-of-themonth-sapiyat-magomedova.
269. The group is alternately referred to as Mothers of Dagestan and Mothers for
Human Rights.
270. Russia: Investigate Dagestan Arson Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Aug. 20,
2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/20/russia-investigate-dagestan-arson-attack.
271. Id.; see Russian Federation—Burning of the Office of Human Rights
Organisation, Mothers of Dagestan, FRONT LINE DEFENDERS (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/2136.
272. Id.
273. Id.

2013]

FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA

75

rights violations.274 For example, in the wake of a police raid in a local
village, they reported residents had been tortured, and the population
was a “scared, beaten and exhausted people.”275
Violence against human rights defenders in Dagestan occurs on a
larger Russian stage, where activists, advocates and lawyers have
been repeatedly targeted and killed in the North Caucasus and
beyond. Chechen President Ramzan Kadryov called those who work
for Memorial, one of the foremost Russian human rights
organizations, “enemies of the people, enemies of the law and
enemies of the state.”276 Kadyrov counted Natalia Estimorova
amongst these enemies. She worked for Memorial, and “was one of
the leading human rights defenders in the North Caucasus.”277
Members of the European Parliament awarded her a medal for her
work in 2005; they stated, “A large part of the Chechen society sees
Natalia as an emblematic moral figure in the non-violent Chechen
resistance . . . . Far from political passions, she is, above all, devoted
to helping victims of violence.”278 In July of 2009, she was kidnapped
near her home in Grozny (Chechnya), and her body was dumped in
the neighboring republic of Ingushetia.279 Natalia Estemiorova had
been shot multiple times.280 Speaking to another human rights
advocate, who expressed concerns for her safety, she said, “There’s so
much to do, so many people, how can I leave them?”281 So while
activists and advocates struggle in Dagestan, they do not struggle
alone.

274. See, e.g., Anna Arutunyan, North Caucasus Violence a Vicious Circle,
MOSCOW NEWS, Sept. 14, 2009, available at LexisNexis; Relatives of Missing Man
Stage Rally in Russia’s Dagestan, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 15, 2008,
available at LexisNexis.
275. Russia: Rights Activists Complain about Police ‘Brutality’ in Dagestan, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 18, 2011, available at LexisNexis.
276. PACE Alarmed by Chechen Leader’s ‘Threats’ at Human Rights Group, RIA
NOVOSTI, July 9, 2010, available at LexisNexis.
277. Natalia Estemirova, CIVIL RTS. DEFENDERS (July 3, 2012),
http://www.civilrightsdefenders.org/uncategorized/human-rights-defenders-of-themonth-natalia-estemirova.
278. Obituary:
Natalia Estemirova, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8152648.stm.
279. Luke Harding, Who Shot Natalia Estemirova?, GUARDIAN (London), July 22,
2009, available at LexisNexis.
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http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/e/natalya_estemirova/inde
x.html.
281. Natalia Estemirova, supra note 277.
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D. The Deafening Silence of Those Who Suffer
Profound consequences result from the targeting of journalists and
defenders and an unwillingness to find their killers. When journalists
and human rights defenders are unable or unwilling to ask the
difficult questions about possible state abuses—be they corruption,
torture or murder, all of which connect to militant violence and the
state’s response—the silence of those who suffer is deafening.
Further exacerbation occurs when officials fail to respond to threats
or adequately investigate murders, let alone when the officials
allegedly commit those offenses. Human Rights Watch notes, “The
authorities indifference to the killings of journalists and
whistleblowers perpetuates impunity and inspires new attacks.”282 It
is also problematic when such violence often occurs in a capital city—
a center for law, policy, and information, as well as citizens.
Makhachkala must do more to protect its residents, particularly those
who have been specifically targeted because of their work exposing
state violations of human rights. Amnesty International offered the
following analysis:
The killing of Omar Saidmagomedov has had a chilling effect
across the North Caucasus. During meetings in republics as far
apart as Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, lawyers were referring
to this case as a kind of warning they felt they had been sent by the
authorities. A further important signal to the professional legal
community in the North Caucasus was the authorities’ response—
the lack of progress in examining the suspicious circumstances of
this case and the evident resistance to investigate the law
enforcement officials involved in connection with this killing.283

IV. FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA: THE PEOPLE IN
BETWEEN
Dagestanis, and indeed many of those in the North Caucasus, are
the people in between. They are neither perceived of as Russian nor
are they sovereign. King and Menon concur in noting, “The pivotal
question for the North Caucasus is its place within the Russian
Federation. So long as the Russian state relies on proxies, proconsuls,
and raw power to ensure order, the region will revert to what it was in

282. Russia: Journalist Killed—Authorities Ignored Threats, Attacks Against Him
supra note 242.
283. AMNESTY INT’L, CONFRONTING THE CIRCLE OF INJUSTICE 41 (2013), available
at
http://www.amnesty.at/uploads/tx_amnesty/Confronting_circle_of_Injustice_FINAL.
pdf.
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the tsarist era—a troublesome, exotic appendage.”284 And that is
exactly what Moscow has done. From Moscow to Makhachkala, the
rhetoric and reality of dependence and independence has been used
in different ways to court the people’s political affections. The
courtship, however, has become an abusive one as the state and
militants attack each other and those who would stand in their way.
Those in Moscow with the power to create positive change have thus
far failed. Much of this failure appears to lie in an absence of context:
of local governance and center-periphery relations; of the
development of and distinctions between militant groups; and, of
targeting those who defend human rights, whether journalist or
lawyer.
Context is critical because it provides the backdrop against which
people may choose to build relationships—amongst each other and
between the structures of state and society, to transform conflict away
from violence and toward sustainable peace.285 Law is the foundation
for many of these relationships and structures—it dictates, in theory,
how citizens may treat each other and how they may be treated by the
state. It also impacts the position of a state on the international stage.
There has been a profound disrespect for domestic and international
law from Moscow to Makhachkala and both the people and the state
have suffered. Russia is failing to live up to its tremendous potential
in part because it represses its citizens in the name of maintaining
stability. In reality, it is furthering insecurity and helping fuel
violence. Moreover, Russia’s violations of human rights have
undermined, albeit in a limited way, its standing on the international
stage.286
This Article addresses just a fraction of the issues that Dagestan
faces though a discussion of local and regional contexts. Importantly,
embedded in the context, contained in the statistics of unemployment
and death tolls, are the people in between, ordinary Dagestanis who
are suffering. Meanwhile, the Sochi Olympics loom large and near,
physically and temporally, as does the trial of a young man accused of
bombing the Boston Marathon, some 5000 miles away. As this
chapter winds down, so too has news coverage of the brothers
284. Charles King & Rajan Menon, Prisoners of the Caucasus, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2010, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66446/charlesking-and-rajan-menon/prisoners-of-the-caucasus.
285. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION (2003).
286. For example, the United States passed legislation sanctioning Russian state
officials over the custodial death of a whistleblower, Sergei Magnitsky. Kathy Lally
and Will Englund, U.S Legislation Infuriates Russia, WASH. POST, Dec. 7 2012, at A8.
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Tsarnaev and Dagestan. All the while, many on the international
stage suffer from foreign policy whiplash, reeling from one
international disaster to the next, as Dagestanis live and die in
relative silence and obscurity, until the next crisis of violence or
conscience redirects global attention. More questions need to be
asked if answers are to be found to the human rights emergency that
plagues Dagestan. Their humanity demands it, as does ours.

